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Abstract 
This article addresses the comparative advantage of the government to the private property/casualty insurance 
industry for the provision  of insurance coverage  for  catastrophic  losses. That  the government can  play  an 
important role as an insurer of societal losses has been a central public policy principle since at least the New 
Deal. In addition, our government typically automatically provides forms of specific relief following unusually 
severe or unexpected disasters, which itself can be viewed as a form of ex post insurance. This article argues that, 
for systemic reasons, the government is much less effective than the private property/casualty insurance market 
in providing coverage of losses generally, but especially of losses in contexts of catastrophes. 
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Virtually all approaches to the problem of catastrophic loss conclude that the magnitude 
and character of such losses compels some form of governmental solution, whether in the 
form of ex post disaster assistance or ex ante regulation to reduce exposure to the loss. 
With respect  to  disaster  assistance,  for example,  in  the  U.S.,  a  permanent  source  of 
government-provided aid has been in place since the creation of the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration during the New Deal, and is frequently supplemented by the Con- 
gress in response to unusually severe or unexpected disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew 
in 1992 or the Mississippi River floods in 1993. i Indeed, assistance of this form for losses 
from catastrophes follows afortiori, given the wider program of government-sponsored 
insurance providing coverage of non-catastrophic losses such as crop and bank failures, 
unemployment, and more specific losses related to  economic downturns, for example, 
through government guarantees of farm and home mortgages. 
Similarly, though the empirical examples are less dramatic, there appears to be equal 
agreement concerning the  role  of the  government in  creating  incentives to  minimize 
exposure to potentially catastrophic losses through direct regulation. Many commentators, 
for example, advocate land-use controls and enhanced building codes to reduce the impact 
of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. Others promote direct 
governmental regulation of workplace health and safety and of environmental hazards to 
reduce the incidence and magnitude of societal exposure to these sources of loss. 
This approach appears  to be  largely accepted by the authors of the four articles on 
hurricanes  and asbestos  prepared  for this  conference. These  writers  seem  to  concur, 
despite the disparate character of the natural or social disasters which they address, that 220  GEORGE L. PRIEST 
governmental action in some form provides the most promising feasible solution. Thus, 
with respect to hurricanes, Mr. Jobe urges greater land-use controls and zoning to limit or 
prohibit growth in high-risk areas  (Jobe,  1996), just as  Professor Kunreuther calls  for 
more stringent building codes as well as government-sponsored "all natural hazards in- 
surance" and government reinsurance (Kunreuther, 1996).  Similarly, with respect to as- 
bestos, Professor Viscusi describes governmental regulation as "potentially a very effec- 
tive mechanism for ensuring that the level of risk exposures is not too great..." (Viscusi, 
1996). And, most vigorously of all, Mr. Sinfield argues that "[g]overnment intervention is 
necessary to control the whole compensation environment," concluding that "[i]n essence 
I believe that it is time for central control and leadership in society" (Sinfield, 1966). 
These endorsements of enhanced government insurance and regulation in the context of 
catastrophes are commended, if no more, by the eminence of these commentators within 
their respective fields. The fact that they are unanimous in the approach surely strengthens 
the point. Moreover, it should not be ignored that these respective calls for greater gov- 
ernment involvement in the context of catastrophic losses derive from individuals who, 
either as  private-sector insurers  or as  economists, might  otherwise be  expected to be 
suspicious  of a  greater governmental role.  2 This  article, however, attempts  a  different 
view. It addresses more generally the role of government, versus the market, in providing 
insurance for losses caused by catastrophic events, whether, after the fact, through the 
provision of government insurance, or, in anticipation of the loss, through regulation.  3 It 
begins from the substantial theoretical and empirical literature describing the operation of 
the private market for insurance. Over the years, the scholarly community has developed 
a strong and clear understanding of how private insurance operates; the learning of this 
literature is widely accepted and is shared, I would believe, by virtually all participants at 
this  conference. This  article  does  little  more than  bring this  learning  to  bear  on the 
question of the most effective means of dealing with catastrophic loss through insurance 
or regulation and the comparative advantage,  if any,  of the government in doing so.  I 
believe that it is an implication of our understanding of insurance that there are serious 
questions as to whether the government can serve as the most effective insurance mecha- 
nism or is, in contrast, structurally prevented from effectively serving an insurance role, 
both in the context of catastrophes and in contexts of less calamitous forms of loss. The 
empirical demonstration of this point is difficult, of course, because our experience has 
been so affected by the governmental insurance programs in effect since the New Deal. I 
believe that it is the implication of the approach, however, that once weaned from gov- 
ernment assistance, it will become clear that the market for private insurance, rather than 
the government, provides substantially greater hope for dealing with catastrophes as well 
as other societal losses. This conclusion suggests that the most common solutions pro- 
posed for addressing catastrophic losses must be more closely examined. 
Section 1 presents a simple and, I believe, uncontroversial discussion of how insurance 
in a competitive market operates to reduce the risk level. Section 2 compares the ability 
of the government to provide similar insurance services. It includes a discussion of two 
recent reports of government-provided disaster assistance that suggest systemic problems 
with government-provided insurance services. Section 3, then addresses the comparative 
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few strong reasons to expect risk regulation by the government to be more effective than 
regulation by a competitive insurance market, though this descussion must remain specu- 
lative given the  often perverse regulatory incentives created by ex post  governmental 
insurance systems. Section 3 also evaluates the civil liability system as a regulator, most 
questionable in the context of catastrophic loss. 
1. A  Simple discussion of how insurance reduces  risks 
There are three principal features of the operation of insurance that determine the extent 
to which an insurance regime effectively reduces the risk level: the aggregation of risks, 
the segregation of risks into separate risk pools, and the control of moral hazard through 
deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusions of coverage. These features of insurance markets 
are surely well-known to participants at the conference. Thus, I will only briefly review 
them in order to provide background for the broader analytical point. 
1.1.  Risk aggregation 
Insurance operates where losses have some stochastic or probabilistic character. Losses 
that are certain to occur in some particular period cannot be insured against; one can only 
accumulate savings before the loss  occurs or shift savings  after the loss  is suffered to 
restore the previous economic position. In contrast, for insurance to reduce the risk level, 
the insured losses must be probabilistic, either as to whether or not the losses will occur 
at all, or as to when losses certain to occur actually will occur (for example, whether one 
will die before or after full life expectancy). 
Insurance reduces the risk level by aggregating uncorrelated risks. To the degree that 
risks are uncorrelated (that is, statistically independent), aggregation will reduce variance 
by leading the error terms of the risks to cancel out. Aggregation does not change the 
extent of underlying loss. However, the cumulative risk of loss, measured by the variance 
of the distribution, can be reduced by aggregation, again, to the extent that individual risks 
are statistically independent. For statistically independent risks, the sum of the aggregated 
risks is less than the sum of the risks taken individually. 
The risk-reducing function of aggregation derives from operation of the law of large 
numbers--the empirical phenomenon according to which the probability density function 
of a loss tends to become concentrated around the mean as the sample number increases. 
The law of large numbers implies that, as one increases the number of insured persons 
possessing independent and identically valued risks, one increases the accuracy of pre- 
diction of the  risk  generated by each  individual.  The  increase  in  predictive  accuracy 
derives from the reduction in the variance of risk of expected outcomes. 
Much of the discussion of insurance--especially in the legal literature--describes the 
aggregation function with the use of the metaphor of"spreading," that is, "risk-spreading" 
or "loss-spreading," rather than as risk-reduction. It is important, however, to distinguish 
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concerning utility levels or distributional preference and employing a large population of 
insureds to reduce the risk level by canceling out risk terms. The important difference is 
that,  to the  extent that the  losses  and accompanying risks  are truly independent, their 
aggregation not only shifts or spreads them from one individual to a  group of others, 
diminishing the impact of a loss on an individual insured, but it also reduces the total risk 
level of the pool below the pre-aggregated sum of individual risks. 
Loss-spreading or-shifting, in contrast, serves only a distributional end. Spreading does 
not change the risk level; it merely distributes existing risks across a set of the population 
different from the set that suffered the risks in the first instance, and is chiefly defended 
by the assumption of a declining marginal utility of wealth.  4 The operation of the law of 
large numbers on statistically independent risks, in contrast, increases the ability to predict 
the risk level (which is what is meant by canceling out risk terms), and thus reduces the 
effective risk level. 
The law of large numbers will not apply, however, if the risks faced by members of the 
pool are not statistically independent to some degree. Aggregating such risks would be 
unproductive, because the reserves which an insurer would have to maintain would equal 
or, perhaps, exceed the reserves which individuals would have to maintain if uninsured. 
This problem is particularly acute  in the context of catastrophes,  and  it is  why some 
society-wide calamities, such as nuclear war, are essentially uninsurable. Where risks are 
highly correlated, they cannot  be effectively reduced by spreading them among those 
subject to the risk. 
1.2.  Risk segregation 
Risk segregation refers to insurer efforts to distinguish relatively high-risk from low-risk 
insureds and then to assign them to narrowly defined risk pools through the underwriting 
process. Risk segregation reduces the risk level in two separate ways. First, segregation 
can reduce statistical variance below that of a  more broadly aggregated pool.  Second, 
segregation can influence the  level of the risky activity itself by setting the  insurance 
premium to more closely reflect the risk which the activity adds to the pool. 
Segregating high-from low-risk insureds can reduce risk variance and, thus, reduce the 
expected costs of insured injuries. The statistical basis for the effect is straightforward. 
Imagine two populations of insureds, one characterized by high-risk, the other by low- 
risk, for which the risks within each population are independent. Risk pool variance is 
calculated by summing the squares of the differences between each pool element and the 
pool mean. If the two populations are aggregated into a single pool, pool variance equals 
the sum of the squared differences between each high-risk and low-risk element and the 
mean  of the  combined pool.  If,  in  contrast,  the  two  populations  are  segregated  into 
separate  pools,  the  variance  of each pool  equals  the  sum  of the  squared  differences 
between each element and the respective means of each segregated pool. It is straight- 
forward that,  to the extent of the  difference between the means  of the two pools, the 
summed variance of the two segregated pools will be less than the variance of the single 
undifferentiated pool. Because segregation reduces variance, it reduces the risk level. THE GOVERNMENT, THE MARKET, AND THE PROBLEM OF CATASTROPHIC  LOSS  223 
Segregating risks by risk level reduces risk variance in a manner very similar to reduc- 
ing risks by aggregation. As described above, by aggregating independent risks into risk 
pools, the insurer increases predictive accuracy by exploiting the law of large numbers. 
Increasing predictive accuracy reduces the risk level of the pool, even if it does not affect 
in any way the frequency of losses that actually occur.  Segregating risks  into separate 
pools according to risk levels serves a complementary function. Like aggregation, segre- 
gation  according to  risk  level  improves  an  insurer's  ability  to  predict  expected loss, 
making possible greater predictive accuracy. Again, this is what is meant by reducing risk 
variance. Thus, relative to broader and undifferentiated risk pools, segregation reduces 
both pool riskiness and total insurance costs (Crocker and Snow,  1986). 
The second risk-reducing function of segregation is to set an insurance premium that 
most accurately reflects the risk that an insured brings to the pool. Here, relative to un- 
differentiated insurance pools, precise risk segregation can reduce the level of underlying 
losses actually suffered. Charging insureds a premium related to underlying risk informs 
the decisions of potential insureds as to whether and how much to engage in the activity 
generating the risk.  For example, the higher auto premiums charged  16- to 25-year-old 
males (or their parents) because of higher expected claims costs serves as a market ra- 
tioning device for teenage male driving. Some young males are prevented from driving or 
encouraged to drive more carefully because of the higher premiums charged or the fear of 
subsequent higher premiums  should they become involved in an accident or commit a 
traffic violation. As a result, relative to a regime without risk segregation, the accident rate 
will be lower. 5 All forms of insurance premium discrimination have this effect. 
Just  as  risk  segregation  charges  appropriately higher premiums  to  the  high-risk,  it 
charges appropriately lower premiums to the low-risk. Here, precise risk pool definition 
extends insurance availability by controlling adverse selection. Since insurance premiums 
must be set according to the average level of risk brought to the pool, the wider the range 
between high-risk and low-risk pool members, the greater the difference between average 
risk and the risk of the low-risk members. If the disparity between the premium and the 
risks added by low-risk members becomes too substantial, low-risk members will drop out 
of the pool, because they find alternative means of protection cheaper than market insur- 
ance.  6 One of the most important reasons that some risks are uninsurable is that insurers 
are unable to narrow the assortment of risks within a risk pool. 
The  aggregation  mad  segregation  functions  of insurance,  then,  are  similar  both  in 
method and effect: Both serve to increase predictive accuracy in order to reduce the risk 
level  and  the  effective costs  of injuries.  Reducing  injury  costs,  however,  necessarily 
generates offsetting effects. Where expected injury costs are lower, the underlying level of 
activity and the  underlying injury rate  will  increase,  a  phenomenon known  as  moral 
hazard. 
1.3. The control of moral hazard through deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusions of 
coverage. 
Insurance regimes can reduce risk by controlling both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. 
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to insured moral hazard. The omnipresent exclusion in life insurance policies of coverage 
of death by suicide is an obvious example. The exclusion serves to control moral hazard 
by removing the incentive that providing large monetary amounts to beneficiaries would 
add  to  other forces compelling the  act.  Less  dramatically, the  exclusion in  consumer 
product warranties of coverage of easily broken glass parts or the easily marred product 
finish, or the exclusion in auto warranties of coverage of engine damage from racing or 
towing heavy loads serves a similar function.  7 These exclusions place the burden of these 
particular losses  on the  insureds themselves, increasing preventive efforts  8 and,  at the 
same time, culling out (segregating) high-risk insureds who are relatively more suscep- 
tible to such losses. 
Insurers  also  control moral  hazard  through  the  definition of insurance  benefits,  in 
particular, through the introduction of deductibles and coinsurance. Deductibles and co- 
insurance shift part of the loss from the insured event back to the insured itself. Only less 
completely than coverage exclusions, deductibles and coinsurance reduce indifference to 
preventive investments, and they reduce the incentives to consume what, from an ex ante 
view, are excessive levels of insurance services. 
Although  deductibles  and coinsurance reduce insurance benefits, they are generally 
essential to the maximization of insurance benefits net of insurance costs. Deductibles and 
coinsurance, obviously, reduce insurance coverage by some proportion. The proportionate 
reduction in coverage is attractive to the dominant set of insurance purchasers, however, 
because, with full coverage, the insurance premium would be much higher. More pre- 
cisely, the existence of moral hazard means that, in comparing full coverage to reduced 
coverage with deductibles and coinsurance, the proportionate increase in premium neces- 
sitated by full coverage is greater than the proportionate increase in insurance benefits to 
the dominant set of insureds. 
Of course, insureds who expect frequent or extensive claims against the insurance are 
likely to prefer full coverage without deductibles  or coinsurance, perhaps  even at the 
higher premium necessitated by that level of coverage. But if there exists a set of insureds 
who want basic insurance coverage, but do not expect frequent or extensive claims, then 
the insurer may optimize insurance sales by tailoring coverage to better meet their needs 
through incorporating deductibles, coinsurance, and specific coverage exclusions. 
The beneficial effects of deductibles, coinsurance, and coverage exclusions as methods 
of controlling moral hazard have been largely neglected. Because these insurance provi- 
sions  directly allocate losses to the  insured, their existence might  seem antithetical to 
broad loss-spreading. But here again, the limitations of the loss-spreading metaphor be- 
comes clear. Deductibles and coinsurance admittedly place some proportion of loss on the 
insured; a coverage exclusion places all of the loss. To this end, these provisions conflict 
with simple loss-spreading. But because such provisions lower total insurance costs, they 
allow the  extension of basic insurance benefits more broadly to the  society. Thus,  for 
example, the exclusion of-life insurance coverage to suicides allows the premium for basic 
life insurance to be lower,  and makes it possible for some individuals who would not or 
could not purchase  life insurance  at  a  higher premium to  obtain  basic  life insurance 
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ductibles,  coinsurance,  and  coverage exclusions  can maximize the  available  insurance 
coverage to the society. 
2. The Government versus  the market as  a  risk-reduction  mechanism 
The previous section described briefly the three basic  functions of insurance operation 
toward the reduction of risks faced by any society. This section evaluates the comparative 
advantage  of the  government to the market as  a  mechanism for risk reduction of this 
nature in the context of catastrophe losses. Most of the examples of the previous section 
were drawn from routine property/casualty contexts, and the propositions were undoubt- 
edly well-known to most readers. The issues raised by catastrophes such as those caused 
by hurricanes or asbestos, however, are not qualitatively different as sources of risk and do 
not obviously compel a  different analytical framework. Those and other castastrophes, 
perhaps, suggest the hardest cases: that is, those contexts in which the effective provision 
of insurance is most difficult. Where the provision of insurance is most difficult, however, 
the most careful attention must be paid to what insurance mechanism is likely to be most 
successful in reducing risk through aggregation, risk segregation, and the control of moral 
hazard. 
Section 2.1. presents an analytical comparison between the private market for insurance 
and  government-provided coverage.  Section 2.2  briefly describes  the  findings  of two 
recent studies of government disaster assistance, suggestive of the approach. 
2.1.  How effective  is government insurance? 
In the most common view, the government is regarded as the most effective insurance 
instrument of the society, with increasing effectiveness as potential disasters increase in 
scale. The central basis  for the view is  straighforward: My friend, former Dean Guido 
Calabresi, for example, has influenced generations of lawyers and judges with his simple 
but convincing point that a loss ruinous to a single individual is less ruinous if spread over 
a larger set of individuals and,  if spread broadly enough, can be made trivial (Calabresi, 
1970).  Calabresi's point derives from nothing more than the assumption of a declining 
marginal  utility of wealth.  On  this  basis,  he  has  popularized the  metaphor of "risk- 
spreading" and "loss-spreading", arguing that, at the limit, the state or government is the 
most effective mechanism for spreading risks and losses broadly. 
According to this view, the state can spread risks most broadly because it is the largest 
social entity in existence. Because of its scope and inclusiveness, the state comprises a 
wide range of disparate activities--indeed the widest range of disparate activities--so it 
would appear able to achieve maximum diversification by pooling the risks of, say, earth- 
quakes with the risks of floods with the risks  of industrial disability.  9 It is also widely 
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over private insurance firms. The state can significantly constrain adverse selection--the 
practice of individuals dropping out of an insurance pool--because it can make insurance 
compulsory, beyond the power of any private insurer. ~  o 
Let us examine more carefully, however, the relative advantages of government versus 
private insurance in the  context of the three risk reduction functions of insurance de- 
scribed above: aggregation, risk segregation, and the control of moral hazard. 
2.1.1. The government versus the market with respect to risk aggregation.  Perhaps the 
strongest  intuitive  case  for government-provided insurance  generally, and  government 
catastrophe insurance in particular, derives from the aggregation function of insurance. It 
seems plausible that the government, given its extraordinary size and scope, is far superior 
to any private insurer in its capacity to reduce risks through aggregation. 
At a first cut, there are reasons to be skeptical of the claims of uniform government 
superiority in size and scope. For example, the private property/casualty industry is highly 
competitive, not naturally monopolistic, and is dominated by firnas with relatively low 
market shares. How can market insurers aggregate effectively with small market shares? 
As the most basic statistical awareness makes clear, within any distribution of risks, risk 
terms can be canceled out by the aggregation of relatively small numbers, as long as the 
risks  are independent and uncorrelated. The most obvious example is modern polling. 
Polling organizations, such as the Gallup, Roper, or Nielsen polls, can estimate the voting 
behavior of 80 million voters or the consumption behavior of 200 million consumers from 
a sample of very small numbers, typically 1,000 or 1,200. Predictive accuracy is achieved 
because, as  long as the poll is conducted randomly--which is  to say,  as  long as each 
observation is  independent and uncorrelated--the cumulative error term becomes very 
small. 
One can see from this formulation that the advantage possessed by the government in 
terms of the scope of activities which it comprises is not clear. Error terms are canceled 
out and predictive ability  is  enhanced--which  is  to  say the  risk  level is reduced--by 
aggregating independent risks, but not by aggregating highly variant risks. The idea that 
diversification can be achieved by lumping together highly variant risks--hurricane risks, 
earthquake risks, disability risks, unemployment risks--is misleading. To reduce the risk 
level by achieving predictive accuracy requires very careful risk sorting and evaluation, 
and ultimately specialization. This is why market insurance firms that are small can spread 
risks very effectively. There is no obvious advantage to government insurance from the 
broad scope of activities that it can incorporate. 
Indeed, in the context of catastrophic loss, the ability of the government to reduce risks 
through  aggregation becomes  even more problematic. The government, by definition, 
must be inclusive in the insurance coverage which it offers. That is, where the government 
provides insurance,  it must  make  it  available  to  all  citizens  desiring  coverage. In the 
context of catastrophes, however, the compulsion of inclusiveness diminishes the ability of 
the government to reduce risks through aggregation. An  event is  labeled a  catastrophe 
where there  is  a  highly correlated incidence of loss  among the population.  Providing 
coverage of highly correlated losses is exactly the opposite of the risk-reducing function 
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discretion to determine the level of catastrophe exposure to accept may be substantially 
more  effective than  a  government in  reducing  the  risks  of catastrophic  loss  through 
aggregation. 
2.1.2.  The government versus the market with respect to risk segregation.  As described 
earlier, in private insurance markets, insurers control adverse selection by segregating the 
low-risk  from the  high-risk  in  order to  offer the  low-risk  lower premiums  to  extend 
insurance availability. The higher premiums charged to the high-risk,  as a price signal, 
reduce the level of risky activities. Moreover, controlling adverse selection by extending 
insurance availability" to the low-risk, makes possible low-risk activities that might other- 
wise be thwarted. 
Government  insurance  typically engages  in  no  efforts to  control  adverse  selection 
through risk pool segregation. Discrimination in government insurance premiums is sup- 
pressed and,  most often, eliminated. Adverse selection occurs in private markets where 
insurers are unable to distinguish among the low-risk and high-risk, leading the low-risk 
to drop out of the  insurance pool. Adverse selection in government insurance markets 
operates  differently. As  mentioned,  government insurance  is  typically offered, without 
discrimination, to all parties at some average premium. There has been very little study of 
the risk level to which this average premium is directed, and it is possible that it is low 
enough to retain some number of low-risk parties. 
Adverse selection, however, will necessarily occur. First, if the government insurance 
plan is self-supporting, some number of low-risk parties necessarily will find the insur- 
ance not worth the premium. Few government plans, however, are fully self-supporting. 
Adverse selection will still occur, nevertheless, but through the effect of a budget con- 
straint imposed on the insurance plan. Because there is little government effort to control 
adverse selection, government insurance plans typically face severe budgetary problems. 
The most typical government response to a budget constraint, however, is not to increase 
the level of discrimination, but rather to lower the average level of benefits, reducing the 
attractiveness  of insurance  and  reducing  the  extent to  which  the  insurance  serves  to 
protect insureds against the risks of their activities. Reducing the extent of benefits, when 
it is  achieved categorically, rather than through deductibles  designed to  control moral 
hazard, shifts--repackages--risks to insureds. 
Often, the adverse selection phenomenon is invoked in favor of government insurance. 
The compulsory nature of government insurance is said to solve adverse selection prob- 
lems that beset private markets by forcing the low-risk to stay in the insurance pool. But 
this effect is not properly viewed as risk reducing. There is no doubt that this form of 
compulsion will lower the necessary insurance premium, but,  since it has no effect on 
reducing the ultimate level of loss--indeed, it may increase loss,  since it increases the 
moral hazard incentives of the low-risk--it is more accurately described as redistribution 
rather than risk reduction. It does not provide an independent reason to view the govern- 
ment as superior to private insurers in employing insurance services to reduce risk. 
2.1.3.  The government versus the market with respect to the control of moral hazard. 
Moral  hazard refers to  how the  existence of insurance  alters  the  incentives faced by 228  GEORGE k. PRIEST 
individuals to increase either the  level of risky activity or of claims on the  insurance. 
Private insurers control moral hazard by collecting deductibles, by sharing risks through 
coinsurance, and by specific limitations on insurance coverage. Each of these methods of 
controlling moral hazard reduces the total level of risk of the activity being insured. 
The government as  an insurer seldom makes  efforts of this nature to control moral 
hazard. Though some government insurance plans incorporate deductibles and coinsur- 
ance, the extent to which these contractual methods are relied upon to reduce risk is much 
less than in the private sector. As  a  consequence, virtually every study of government 
insurance activities shows moral hazard problems to be severe. Many of the participants 
at this conference have proposed greater governmental regulation as a means of control- 
ling moral hazard in specific contexts of catastrophic loss:  for example, through land-use 
controls and building codes for hurricanes, and through occupational health regulation for 
asbestos. It is immediately clear, however, that these forms of regulation depart substan- 
tially from the more precise loss-related effects of deductibles and coinsurance and cor- 
respond more closely to underwriting guidelines. I shall discuss proposals with respect to 
regulation in greater detail below, but it is a  difficult claim that their effects--even if 
optimally defined--will equal those of direct financial incentives established by deduct- 
ibles and coinsurance. Indeed, the existence of deductible and coinsurance provisions in 
virtually all property/casualty contexts, despite full powers to underwrite, suggests that 
underwriting regulations are an imperfect means for achieving this end. 
2.1.4.  Why is the government ineffective in risk reduction? This brief review suggests 
that, in terms of each of the three risk-reduction functions of insurance--aggregation, risk 
segregation, and the control of moral hazard--government-provided insurance is probably 
less  effective, not more effective, than private insurance.  Indeed,  the  disadvantage  of 
government insurance and the comparative advantage of private insurance are likely to be 
only the greater with respect to catastrophic loss. 
Effective risk reduction is achieved by market discipline: by differential charges ac- 
cording to risk level; by constraints on benefits to control moral hazard; and by discrimi- 
nation and narrow risk pool definition to control adverse selection. Private insurers are 
rewarded in the marketplace according to their ability to reduce societal risks in these 
ways. 
In contrast, the state, for very good reasons, is unable to engage in any of these forms 
of market discipline. The size and necessary inclusiveness of government obstructs opti- 
mal risk aggregation. The state's  commitment to nondiscrimination prevents control of 
adverse selection through risk  segregation. The political responsiveness of the state to 
voter interests in benefits cripples efforts to control moral hazard. As a result, the state can 
do little to reduce risk levels. 
It is frequently claimed that the state has an insurance role because it can offer coverage 
in contexts in which there are incomplete insurance markets--for example, the special 
government programs  providing  flood and  riot  insurance.  The  sources  of the  special 
government expertise here, however, are not clear. Private insurance markets are incom- 
plete, not by chance or lack of interest, but because risks are essentially uninsurable where 
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market can survive. The government cannot influence the survivability of an insurance 
pool. Indeed, because the government is less able to control moral hazard and adverse 
selection, the government is probably less able than the private market to make risks truly 
insurable. 
What the government can do, of course, is to redistribute income under an insurance 
guise to activities that could not support an insurance market. Here, of course, the supe- 
riority of the government is obvious. The government may be ineffective at spreading risks 
and  insuring  losses, but  it is  a  powerful source of wealth  redistribution toward losses 
already suffered. Insurance has provided a vehicle for redistribution from the origins of 
the industry, and the industry remains an extraordinary instrument for redistribution today. 
Redistributional goals permeate government control of the insurance industry, from the 
interpretation of insurance contracts to regulation of insurance terms to government in- 
surance involvement itself. 
Redistribution, however, is not insurance. Redistribution does not reduce the risk of loss 
faced by a society but, at best, only repackages or shifts losses to different sets of citizens. 
Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, there are reasons to suspect that government 
insurance systematically redistributes toward more risky, rather than less risky activities. 
If so, then government insurance increases risks to society, exactly the opposite of the 
insurance function. 
2.2.  Some examples of government insurance at work: agricultural disaster assistance 
Two  weeks  prior to  this  conference, the  New  York  Times  uncovered two  unpublished 
government studies reviewing the operation of government-provided disaster assistance. 
The  studies  are  a  draft  evaluation report of the  Inspector General  of the Agriculture 
Department regarding disaster assistance for agriculture following Hurricane Andrew and 
the  1993  Mississippi  floods (U.S.  Agriculture Dept.,  1994),  and a  Staff Report to the 
Senate Agriculture  Committee concerning crop  disaster payments  from  1988  to  1993 
(U.S.  Senate Comm. Rept., 1994). Both reports describe massive payments of disaster aid 
in questionable contexts. While many of the examples presented may represent no more 
than insurance fraud--a problem that also afflicts private insurance--the magnitude and 
character of the problem are suggestive of a broader structural effect. 
Government assistance for agricultural disasters is separate from and additional to other 
government farm assistance programs, such as federal crop insurance. The aid is available 
only where  either disasters  have been  officially declared--such  as  in  the  case  of the 
Mississippi River flooding of 1993, or where, because of the magnitude of loss, the claim 
qualifies as disaster-related. For these programs, disaster aid is calculated according to the 
difference between a producer's actual yield and the expected yield per acre. The expected 
yield is determined, within a state, according to a county average, per crop, and is set by 
the  county office of the Agricultural  Stabilization  and  Conservation  Service  (ASCS). 
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county committee determining these yields and, thus, levels of disaster aid. The difference 
between actual and expected yield is multiplied times an estimate of market price  to 
determine the base level of loss. 
Disaster aid is provided at two different levels, depending upon whether the farmer 
purchased government-supported crop insurance prior to the loss or not. If the farmer 
purchased crop insurance, then the calculation begins by determining the extent to which 
the farmer's actual yield is less than 65% of the county-wide expected yield per acre; if 
the farmer did not purchase crop insurance, then by the extent to which actual yield is less 
than 60% of expected yield. Disaster aid equals 65% of these adjusted losses. 1! In theory, 
thus, if the farmer suffered a total loss, these programs would provide aid equal to .4225 
to those who purchased crop insurance (.65  ×  .65); equal to .39 for those who did not (.60 
×  .65). Put conversely, these insurance programs incorporate a 57.75% coinsurance ob- 
ligation to those who purchase crop insurance and a 61% coinsurance obligation to those 
who do not. Note that these coinsurance amounts are substantially higher than coinsurance 
provisions typically appearing in private insurance markets. 
The findings of the two reports are cumulative, but their flavor can be illustrated with 
a few examples. It was found, for example, that a farmer in Missouri received $200,000 
in disaster aid following the 1993 Mississippi floods, though the farmer had purchased the 
property, including land, house, and equipment, three weeks prior to the flooding for only 
$138,000.12 As an illustration of a more systematic problem, it was discovered that 45% 
of national disaster aid for crop losses of turnip greens were distributed to three individual 
counties, none of which had reported any acreage of turnip greens plantings prior to the 
disaster program. 13 
The problems in the provision of disaster aid highlighted by these reports all derive 
from government management and operation of the system: 
1. The reports found that producers systematically earned more in disaster years than in 
normal years. ASCS, for example, calculated the projected sales for one Florida orchard 
producer whose crops were destroyed by Hurricane Andrew at $145,610  and paid the 
producer $51,000 in disaster and tree assistance for these losses. The Agriculture Depart- 
ment Report found that that producer's prior year gross income under normal growing 
conditions had been only $26,833. t4  Many of these problems stemmed from apparent 
miscalculations of prevailing market prices for purposes of calculating expected returns. 
In other cases, the ASCS committee did not seriously monitor producers'  claims with 
respect to  affected acreage. As  an example, the Report found that one Florida ASCS 
committee calculated a disaster payment of $96,000 to a producer for losses to 1,900 acres 
of grass seed, when, in fact, the acreage was not a commercial seed operation, but carried 
livestock, is Similarly, the reports found substantial levels of aid distributed to farmers for 
losses to double-cropped acreage. For example, a review of one Georgia county found that 
31  of 48 turnip green producers receiving aid had both double-cropped the greens after 
peanut and cotton harvests and had failed to irrigate the greens.16 
2. The reports found that the structure of disaster payments was often unrelated to the 
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after market prices for crops fell, because, given the lower market price, producers did not 
find it worthwhile to harvest the crop. In addition, disaster aid, calculated as the difference 
between expected yield and actual yield, is not adjusted for the cost savings that become 
available from not harvesting the crop. 17 
3. The reports found that disaster aid was not adjusted for losses that might be attributed 
to producer behavior itself. The Agriculture Department Report concluded that "County 
committees were not required to, and generally did not, reduce the level of benefits even 
through producers did not plant within the optimum growing season, did not irrigate, and 
did not apply appropriate levels of fertilizer, herbicides, insecticides, etc.  ''~ s 
4. The Agriculture Department Report concluded that "None of the producers cited in 
these findings bore the first 40% of loss from the disaster, as required by regulation...,,19 
Both reports found that overpayments in agricultural aid were growing over time, as the 
Congress increased appropriations for disaster aid.  2° 
Typical of government reports,  of course,  the  recommendations of the  two  studies 
consist of changes chiefly in the management details of the programs: tighter monitoring, 
better record keeping, reassignment of directors, and the like. The problems indicated by 
these studies, however, appear more systemic and are related to government versus private 
provision of insurance. 
Risk aggregation. There is little in the government provision of disaster insurance that 
resembles the aggregation of independent and uncorrelated risks. On the contrary, gov- 
ernment assistance is defined to become operative only when risks occur that are highly 
correlated, exactly the opposite of the risk-reducing character of insurance. 
Risk segregation. Insurers reduce the risk level by segregating high-risk from low-risk 
activities and charging risk-related premiums that create price signals discouraging risky 
activities. Risk segregation of this nature is totally alien to government-provided disaster 
insurance which charges no pre-loss premiums whatsoever. Thus, it is not surprising that 
claims against the disaster insurance continue to rise year after year, a phenomenon that 
would lead to cancellation or nonrenewal in the private insurance market, but that follows 
systemically from no-premium insurance. 
Control of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Closely related is the fact that private 
insurers reduce risks through defining deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusion provisions 
to  penalize high-risk behavior.  Government disaster  insurance,  defined as  aid  for the 
needy, is antithetical to exclusions or other limitations of coverage. Though, in theory, the 
governmental disaster aid described above includes a significant coinsurmace  feature, in 
practice, the coinsurance is  ineffective, as illustrated by the many examples of farmers 
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Problems with government management. Government disaster insurance is provided on 
the basis of estimates of projected yields crop-by-crop, county-by-county, across the U.S. 
It  is  unrealistic  to  imagine  that  all  such  decisions  could be  intelligently made  from 
Washington,  D.C.  While  it is  not inconceivable that the  government might establish a 
network  of local  agents  similar  to  those  of large  national  casualty  carriers,  it  is  not 
surprising, given its democratic character, that our government has delegated operational 
decisions to separate county committees, whose members are appointed from among local 
producers and farmers themselves. Yet, given this delegation, it is also not surprising that 
the ethic of committee management will involve extending aid as broadly as possible-- 
including  self-dealing--rather than  the  disinterest  and  discipline  characteristic  of the 
adjustment process in private casualty markets. Unlike private insurers, there is no incen- 
tive for government insurance managers to carefully monitor the need for insurance, to 
underwrite risks as precisely as possible, to evaluate and adjust claimed losses to avoid 
overpayments and, more generally, to maximize insurance sales by structuring insurance 
policies in order to provide the maximum coverage at the lowest total premium. 
More generally, the principles that motivate the maximization of profit and insurance 
coverage to  a  private  insurer are  directly opposite to  the  principles  that  motivate the 
government provision of insurance in general and of coverage of catastrophic losses in 
particular. Political incentives compel inclusiveness, not the aggregation of only uncorre- 
lated risks; the maximization of total benefits, not the careful definition through deduct- 
ibles and exclusions to maximize only basic coverage; the avoidance and elimination of 
discrimination,  not the  deliberate attempt to  make  certain that  high-risk  insureds  pay 
premiums appropriate to the risk that they bring to the pool; the most expansive forms of 
coverage,  not  continuous  efforts to  exclude  coverage attended by moral  hazard.  The 
principles underlying the government's provision of insurance are directly antagonistic to 
insurance as a risk-reduction mechanism. 
3. The Government versus the market as a  regulator 
This section briefly reviews the comparative advantage of the government to the market in 
terms  of regulating  risks  to reduce their ultimate  impact.  Virtually all  commentators, 
including the authors of the preceding papers of this conference, advocate an important 
role for government regulation in this respect, whether in the form of enhanced zoning, 
land-use controls and stricter building  code requirements in the  case of hurricanes, or 
more effective occupational health and safety regulation in the case of asbestos. Section 
3.1  will address the direct forms of governmental regulation suggested by these recom- 
mendations. Section 3.2 will address the liability system as a risk-regulation device. 
3.1. Direct regulation  by the government and by private insurers 
Each of the preceding authors at this conference has recommended enhanced governmen- 
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other occupational or environmental harms. The foundation for these recommendations is 
clear: If fewer citizens build homes on southeastern beaches, or if they build their homes 
with stronger structural elements or design, there will be fewer losses from hurricanes. 
Similarly, if some governmental authority had in the past constrained the manufacture of 
asbestos or in the future would constrain the manufacture of some soon-to-be-discovered 
occupational hazard, there would have been or will be lower levels of occupational loss. 
However counterfactual, these conclusions are uncontroversial. The appropriate ques- 
tion, however, is not simply whether government can do better, but whether government 
can do better than private insurers. Private insurers are not indifferent to the prevention of 
loss and engage in loss-prevention activities in many forms. Much of private loss preven- 
tion is implemented through the underwriting process. Insurers who offer lower premiums 
to firms which have installed fire protection systems or who refuse coverage entirely to 
firms without them are engaging in a form of risk reduction through regulation. Similarly, 
the  implementation  of deductibles,  coinsurance,  and  coverage exclusions,  by creating 
financial incentives for insureds to avoid loss, indirectly affect risk reduction. Finally, the 
levy of differential insurance premiums according to risk level and the refusal to offer 
coverage for some sets of risks affect risk reduction investments by firms or individuals 
that either engage in the activity at their own risk or move their investments into safer 
activities. 
The question,  then,  is  which  mechanism  for reducing risk  is  likely to be the  more 
successful? There seems to be an implicit conclusion of authors recommending govern- 
mental regulation that risk regulation by private insurers is somehow unavailable or must 
necessarily be insufficient. The explanation for this conclusion, however, is not immedi- 
ately evident. Indeed, just as we have observed that differences between risk reduction in 
terms of the provision of ex post insurance as between governmental and market sources 
are  substantial,  there  is  little  reason to  believe that  such  differences will  not also  be 
manifest in contexts of direct regulation itself. 
Put less abstractly, assuming that there is some optimal, cost-effective building code or 
zoning definition for some hurricane-exposed area, is the society more likely to find such 
a  definition put  in place  through collective action through the  political process  or by 
private insurers in a competitive marketplace? In principle, there is no reason to believe 
that private insurers cannot determine the optimal building code and implement it through 
underwriting decisions. New houses might only be insurable if they met the requirements 
of that code. Existing houses might only be insurable or insurable at a particular rate if 
investments are made to comply with the code. Similarly, private insurers might define the 
optimal zoning or land-use policy through their underwriting decisions as to whom and at 
what locations to provide coverage of hurricane-related losses. 
Some proponents of government regulation suggest that there might be cases in which 
there are collective goods problems with respect to loss prevention (Kunreuther,  1996). 
For example, a private insurer in a competitive market might well be able to implement 
through underwriting building  or structural  requirements that provide for optimal  loss 
prevention for, say, an individual home, but may be indifferent to structural requirements 
within a single home that are beneficial to the neighboring group of homes. Of course, the 
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this nature exists,  it is not solved by the competitive desire  of the insurer to provide 
coverage for more than one home in the neighborhood or that it could not be solved by 
industry standardization, as is the case for standardization problems in other industries. 
More importantly, the policy issue is not whether market imperfections can be defined in 
theory, but whether it is plausible that theoretical market imperfections will be solved by 
practical government. Indeed, the factors that point to superior risk-reduction discipline by 
private insurers in the context of the provision of insurance coverage appear to derive from 
regulatory ability: from the absence of an ethic of maximizing inclusiveness; from the 
ability and the financial incentive to carefully discriminate on grounds of riskiness; from 
the advantages of controlling moral hazard through shifting risk to the insured parties. 
Each of these factors seems no less applicable to risk regulation than to risk reduction 
through the definition of insurance coverage. 
There are two more serious explanations why private insurers may lack underwriting 
discipline which are related to governmental activities themselves. First, many govern- 
ments compel insurers to provide disaster-related insurance as an element of coverage. 
The State of California, for example, has compelled the inclusion of earthquake coverage 
in the basic homeowners' policy. Given such a compulsion, the calculus for the insurer 
becomes more complicated: It is no longer, is it possible to offer such coverage, and, if so, 
to whom and in what locations, but rather, are we more likely to profit with or without the 
entire line of homeowners' coverage? 
Closely related is the fact that the existence of governmental insurance and the potential 
of governmental relief in the future complicates the calculus to the private insurer.  In 
contrast, where a state is credibly committed to providing no  relief in the context of a 
disaster, and, thus, where the only source of disaster coverage is that available from private 
insurers, the underwriting process is clean, and market incentives may serve to generate 
optimal building codes or zoning plans, irrespective of governmental action. Where the 
governmental response to a disaster is uncertain, the calculus changes dramatically. The 
insurer who might become insolvent should an earthquake or hurricane of a particular 
magnitude occur,  and,  thus, who might otherwise enforce strictly optimal underwriting 
requirements, must now evaluate its position in the market given some likelihood that the 
state will itself shoulder the losses, whether through disaster assistance to the victims (as 
recent examples, through providing lodging and relocation assistance) or,  at the  limit, 
through the state's insurance guarantee fund for insolvent insurers. 
3.2.  The liability system as a  regulatory mechanism 
In recent years, the law and economics literature has portrayed the civil liability system in 
this country as a risk regulation device (Posner,  1993). In theory, civil liability judgments 
serve to impose the price of risky behavior on the individual or firm creating the risk, 
leading to optimal ex ante risk reduction as well as optimal ex post compensation (cov- 
erage of the loss). The expansion of liability since the mid-1960s has been largely justified 
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Mr.  Sinfield's graphic description of the asbestos problem surely challenges this Pan- 
glossian view of the world. While there is some argument available that the experience of 
the asbestos manufacturers and the unfortunate insurers who had dealings with them will 
serve to deter the future manufacture of hazardous  substances,  it would be fanciful to 
describe that deterrence as optimal or to imagine that any further liability can helpfully 
add  to  the  effect.  Indeed,  catastrophic  losses,  almost by  definition, would  seem poor 
candidates for deterrence through the liability system.  2~ 
The failings of the liability system as a risk-reduction mechanism, however, may not be 
unrelated to the failings of government insurance and regulation generally. Most impor- 
tantly, the safety standards generated by the civil liability system are not standards derived 
in  the  face  of financial  incentives  created by a  competitive market.  Instead,  they are 
constructed by judges on grounds largely innocent of economic effect--whether effects 
on  consumers  or  on  manufacturers.  In  addition,  they  are  implemented by  lay juries 
through some process of collective action, if anything, more undisciplined than legislation 
with respect to effect. There is no reason to believe that such judgments  approach the 
optimal. 
4. Conclusion: insurance, the government, and catastrophes 
This article has viewed catastrophic loss as a problem in risk reduction and has attempted 
to analyze whether insurance and regulation provided by the government or the market is 
more likely to be successful as a risk-reduction mechanism. Putting the question in this 
way, by definition, challenges the view--perhaps it should be described as a normative 
belief--that providing disaster relief is one of the principal functions, if not the most basic 
function,  of government.  It  is  not  evident,  however, that  catastrophic  losses  generate 
public goods problems. Indeed, on the contrary, when examined carefully in terms of the 
mechanics of risk reduction, there are reasons to believe that the government is particu- 
larly ineffective as an insurance provider and even as a regulator. 
If the societal goal is to optimize risk reduction, there are strong reasons to terminate 
government disaster  assistance  in  its  entirety.  Such a  policy would require those that 
engage  in  relatively risky activities,  such  as  building  homes  on coasts,  fault lines,  or 
floodplains, to learn from private market premiums what the risk-related costs of their 
location decisions actually are. Yet, even if it is  fanciful to imagine that a 20th-century 
government will  abjure  the  political  gains  from disaster  assistance,  there  are  equally 
strong reasons to redesign government aid on the principles of market insurance, includ- 
ing pre-loss premiums that are risk-related with coverage limitations, including deduct- 
ibles, coinsurance, and exclusions of particularly risky activities that maximize coverage 
net of loss. However generous and humanitarian our governments may be, all face serious 
budget  constraints.  Just  as  with  private  insurance,  the  implementation  of risk-related 
premiums, deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusions can serve to maximize government 
coverage to best achieve its admirable humanitarian ends. 236  GEORGE L. PRIEST 
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Notes 
13.  U.S. 
14.  U.S. 
15.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 21). 
16.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p.  10). 
17.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p.  12). 
18.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 9). 
19.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 5). 
1.  See, for example, the Dire  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1992  (Hurricane Andrew); 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Relief From the Major Widespread Flooding in the Midwest 
Act of 1993. 
2.  The  recommendation of greater government regulation  in  Professor Viscusi's analysis of the  asbestos 
problem  is perhaps  most  striking,  given that  he  has made  his  academic  reputation  demonstrating the 
imperfections of governmental risk regulation in a wide range of other areas. 
3.  Much of the discussion derives from a talk which 1 gave as the Inaugural Address for the John M.  Olin 
Professorship in Law and Economics at Yale in November 1986. 
4.  See the discussion of Guido Calabresi's advocacy of risk-spreading, in/i'a TAN __ 
5.  For a  demonstration of a  dramatic increase in the  accident rate  following the prohibition of insurance 
discrimination by age, sex, violation record, and accident experience in Quebec, see Devlin (1988) (9.6% 
increase in fatal accidents, 26.7% increase in bodily injury claims, and 5.3% increase in property damage 
claims following adoption of nondiscriminating, no-fault plan). 
6.  For empirical estimate of adverse selection from the adoption of nondiscriminating, no-fault auto insurance 
in Quebec, see Devlin (1988,  p. 21, p. 24) (decline of 8.1% in total auto registrations, though an underes- 
timate of decline in registrations by low-risk, since number includes increase in registrations by high-risk). 
7.  See, Priest (1981) generally, for many other examples. 
8.  Direct-risk monitoring by insurers (such as requiring the installation of specific safety devices and inspect- 
ing for compliance) is very similar to the control of moral hazard by exclusions. Private insurers can be 
expected to select the combination of such techniques most effective in terms of sales, which is to say, in 
terms of extending insurance most broadly.  See Priest (1981),  generally. 
9.  Professor Kunreuther endorses this point in his article in this issue. 
10.  Though unrelated to the analysis in this article, it is also frequently claimed that the state is superior to the 
private sector in the marketing and administration of an insurance program. The best evidence is the very 
low administrative costs of Social Security--2% of benefits--far lower than any private insurance plan and 
far lower even than comparable social insurance plans in othe~sma[le~countries. 
11.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  pp.  1 2). 
12.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 6). 
Senate Comm. Rept. (1994,  p.  1). 
Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 5). 
20.  U.S. Agriculture Dept. (1994,  p. 30);  U.S. Senate Comm. Rept. (1994,  pp 5-6). 
21.  Thus, it is unnecessary to rehearse the many weaknesses of our modern civil liability system in dealing with 
more ordinary sources of loss. See Priest (1987). 
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